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Limiting the Mortgage Interest Deduction by 
Size of Home: Effects on the U ser Cost and 
Price of Housing Across Metropolitan Areas 
Andrew Hanson 
f;iff!h@t§i 
In this paper, I examine the user cost and home price implications of limiting the federal 
mortgage interest deduction (MID) based on the square footage of a home. I extend the 
standard user cost model to include a square footage-based cap on the tax-favored status 
of mortgage interest. I compare two policy alternatives: one that limits the marginal 
deduction based on home size, and another that removes the deduction on the home 
based on borne size. There is substantial variation across metropolitan areas in both the 
nurnber of bornes exposed to each type of cap, the user cost increase, and the resulting 
expected price declines. 
The mortgage interest deduction (MID) is the largest housing-related subsidy in the United 
States federal budget, allowing forgone revenue of over $104 billion in fiscal year 2011 
(Executive Office of the President, 2010). Recently, severa! proposals have been rnade to 
limit the MID by capping1 the arnount of interest that qualifies for a deduction frorn 
taxable income. In 2005 , President George W. Bush's Tax Reform Panel suggested 
replacing the MID with a 15% tax credit and limiting the size of mortgage available for 
the credit based on regional home prices. More recently, the National Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (commonly referred to as the Bowles-Simpson 
Commission) recommended switching the MID toa 12% tax credit and lowering the size 
of eligible mortgage to $500,000. Another recent proposal, conceived by Congressmen 
John Dingell (D-MI),2 suggests limiting the MID based on the square footage of a borne, 
rather than by the amount borrowed. 
Part of the rnotivation behind targeting large bornes, rather than debt financing, is that 
the size of bornes has grown substantially in the last 30 years, resulting in externalities 
from decreased density, further commuting, and increased energy use for heating and 
cooling larger spaces. According to the National Association of Hornebuilders, the average 
square footage for a new single-family home completed in 2009 was 2,438. This 
represents an increase of more than 350 square feet from the average in 1990 and an 
increase of almost 700 square feet from the average in 1980.3 The rnechanisrn for reducing 
the size of bornes in changing the MID is to increase the cost of owning a larger home, 
thus discouraging home purchase on the extensive margin. 
An academic discussion of eliminating or capping the MID has been on-going for sorne 
time (e.g., Woodward and Weicher, 1989; Follain and Melamed, 1998; Green and Vandell, 
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1999; Anderson, Clemens, and Hanson, 2007; and Poterba and Sinai, 2008). Proponents 
of the MID argue that it eliminates the distortion that would otherwise occur in the tax 
code between debt and equity financing of a home. Opponents argue that a deduction 
is not appropriate unless the imputed rental income from housing is taxed, and that the 
MID is unwisely targeted and does not promote ownership because it is most valuable 
to upper income households who itemize deductions and those facing higher marginal 
tax rates.4 
In this paper, 1 make three contributions to the discussion on changing MID policy. First, 
1 extend the familiar user cost model of housing to in elude a MID cap based' on the square 
footage of a home. Second, 1 use the updated model to determine how limiting the MID 
based on square footage would affect the annual cost of homeownership and home price 
levels nationally and across metropolitan areas. Third, 1 compare changes across 
metropolitan areas for two policy alternatives: a cap that phases out the entire value of 
the MID on a sliding scale as the square footage of a home increases, as Dingell's proposal 
called for (referred to as a clawback cap), and a flat national square footage cap. 
Estimating the user cost impact of proposed policy is crucial, as it is the cost of owning 
increase that will elicit any change in the size of home purchased by consumers. 
Using data from the American Housing Survey on the square footage of homes, 1 simulate 
the share of homes exposed to each size-based MID cap. A national cap on the MID for 
square footage over 3,000 square feet is binding for about 9.4% of homes throughout the 
U.S. Under the flat cap policy alternative, removing the deduction on marginal borrowing 
would in crease user cost by 7 .8%. The user cost increase from the flat cap across 
metropolitan areas would range from a low of 1.3% in Rochester, New York toa high of 
17.1% in Riverside, California. Under the clawback cap, user cost would increase by 17.3% 
nationally. The user cost increase from the clawback cap across metropolitan areas would 
range from a low of 4.7% in Rochester, New York to a high of 38.8% in Riverside, 
California. Nationally, these user cost changes would translate into expected price 
declines on homes exposed to the clawback cap of $67,834, and range from a decline 
of $196,171 in San Diego, California to a decline of $10,071 in Rochester, New York. 
Expected price declines under the flat cap are about half the magnitude of declines under 
the clawback proposal, averaging $33,507 nationally, and ranging from $2,918 in 
Rochester, New York to $98,039 in San Diego, California. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, 1 outline the user 
cost model adjusted for a square footage based MID cap. In the third section, 1 present 
the simulation results for proposals that limit the MID based on the square footage of a 
home. In the fourth section, 1 discuss other aspects of limiting the MID based on square 
footage. The final section is a concluding commentary . 
• User Cost Model Adjusted for MIO Square Footage Limit The standard user cost model5 of housing represents the annual profit from 
homeownership (A) as the difference between imputed renta! value, R, and the annual 
costs associated with awning a home as they relate to the purchase price, P H · Although 
notation sometimes differs, sorne form of the following equation typically represents the 
model: 
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A = R - [(1 - r)'rP + (1 - r)(l - ())i1 + (1 - r)()i2 + m - 1r]PH, (1) 
where rP is the annual property tax rate, r is the marginal income tax rate (a function of 
annual income), () is the share of the house that is financed with debt (where () :::; 1), i 1 
is the interest rate that would be earned on an alternative asset, i2 is the interest rate paid 
on a mortgage, m is annual maintenance costs, and 7T is house price inflation net of 
depreciation. Equation (1) accounts for the mortgage interest deduction as well as the 
deduction for property taxes, both of which reduce the cost of homeownership. 
In equilibrium, the annual profit from homeownership equals zero. Equation (2) 
represents the rental price of housing after setting A equal to zero: 
R = [(1 - r)rp + (1 - r)(l - ())i1 + (1 - r)()i2 + m - 7T]Pw (2) 
Flat Cap on Square Footage 
Capping the mortgage interest deduction by the size of the home changes the third term 
in equation (2) by creating a relative price difference between purchasing square footage 
with debt financing below the limit, and above the limit. The term Sq reflects this 
difference, where: 
Sq = (Total Square Footage 
- Square Footage Limit)/(Total Square Footage) if (Total Square Footage 
- Square Footage Limit) ;:::: O, Sq = O otherwise. (3) 
Sq represents the share of the home above the square footage limit. Note that any housing 
financed with equity is not subject to the differential price caused by a square footage 
cap. With the introduction of a flat square footage cap on the MID, the third term in 
equation (2) splits into the share that retains the mortgage interest deduction, (1 - Sq) 
and the share that is no longer deductible, Sq, where Sq :::; 1, resulting in: 
R cap = [(1 - T)Tp + (1 - r)(l - ())i1 + Sq()i2 + (1 - Sq)(l - r)()i2 + m - 7T]PH. (4) 
Notice that the third and fourth terms in equation (3) represent the difference in the 
price of financing with debt above (third term) and below (fourth term) the square 
footage cap. In order to relate the square footage cap to the user cost model, 1 must 
assume that the mortgage interest rate is constant for all square footage of a particular 
house. Conceivably, 1 could relax this assumption if 1 knew how the mortgage interest 
rate changes with square footage for each house. For the current purpose, this assumption 
is reasonable, as 1 examine the average user cost change at the metropolitan area level.6 
Applying the same interest rate to all square footage in this way mimics current law 
treatment on debt financed housing and the interaction with current MID limits. The 
annual increase in the user cost of homeownership resulting from the flat square footage 
cap equals: 
(5) 
The annual increase in user cost depends on a taxpayer's marginal tax rate, t, which 
increases with income. The marginal cost of purchasing an additional square foot of 
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housing, financed with debt, over the limit increases from (1 - T)i2 to i2 with the limit 
in place. The increase in marginal cost will be greater for those with a higher marginal 
tax rate (taxable income). In effect, the policy places a tax of Ti2 on purchasing square 
footage financed with debt above the limit. 
Solving the user cost model for price changes instead of user cost changes, yields a price 
difference of: 
(6) 
Where e cap represents the term in brackets in equation ( 4) and e represents the term in 
brackets in equation (2). 
MID Clawback Proposal 
Another policy alternative, presented by Representative John Dingell (D-MI), also involves 
capping the mortgage interest deduction based on the square footage of a home, but 
would remove the deduction on the entire home as size increases. This proposal again 
changes the third term in equation (2); however, it does so differently than the flat cap. 
Dingell's proposal calls for the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction on the 
entire home as the size of home increases, in effect " clawing-back" the existing 
deduction. The clawback cap phases out the MID according to the following schedule: 
100% of deduction available for homes less than 3,000 sq. ft. ; 85% of deduction available 
for homes 3,000-3,199 sq. ft.; 70% of deduction available for homes 3,200-3 ,399 sq. ft .; 
55% of deduction available for homes 3,400-3,599 sq. ft .; 40% of deduction available for 
homes 3,600-3,799 sq. ft . 25% of deduction available for homes 3,800-3,999 sq. ft .; 10% 
of deduction available for homes 4,000-4,199 sq. ft. ; and 0% of deduction available for 
homes larger than 4,200 sq. ft. 
Equation (7) represents the user cost of housing under the clawback proposal. This 
equation differs from equation ( 4) by taking into account the removal of the entire 
deduction as the size of home increases with a piecewise function: 
R C/awback = [(1 - T)Tp + (1 - 7)(1 - 8)i1 + (1 - ST)8i2 + m - 7T]PH. (7) 
Where, s = {1 , if sq. ft. < 3,000, 0.85 if 3,000 ::::; sq. ft . ::::; 3,199, 0.70 if 3,200 ::::; sq. 
ft . ::::; 3,399, 0.55 if 3,400 ::::; sq. ft. ::::; 3,599, 0.40 if 3,600 ::::; sq. ft. ::::; 3,799, 0.25 if 
3,800 ::::; sq. ft . ::::; 3,999, 0.10 if 4,000 ::::; sq. ft. ::::; 4,199, and O if sq. ft . ;:::: 4,200} . 
Modeling the user cost of the clawback proposal does not require an assumption about 
the marginal interest rate of a square foot of housing because the reduction in the MID 
is defined by the size of house directly. The clawback proposal causes an annual increase 
in the cost of homeownership with respect to the standard model equal to: 
Rctawback - R = T8iz(1 - s)PH. (8) 
Solving the user cost model with the clawback cap for price changes instead of user cost 
changes, yields a price difference of: 
PH C!awback- PH = - T8iz(1 - s)R! (CctawbackC), (9) 
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where Cctawback represents the term in brackets in equation (7) and C represents the term 
in brackets in equation (2). 
The user cost difference from the proposals increase as a taxpayer's marginal tax rate, t, 
increases. The annual cost change decreases with respect to s, so that larger homes 
experience a larger cost increase. Exhibit 1 shows how both proposals change the average 
user cost for housing over the 3,000 square foot cap level relative to the user cost tmder 
the cap. The clawback proposal would create a lumpy pattern in average user cost 
because removing the deduction follows a step function. The marginal cost (the slope of 
each line) is large under the clawback proposal where changes in s would occur, but 
otherwise follows the same pattern that occurs with no policy change. The flat cap would 
create a smooth increase in average cost after home size reaches the cap, meaning 
marginal cost above the cap would be constant but greater than below the cap. 
Both user cost models represent static changes in user cost in that they do not account 
for any potential changes to mortgage interest rates or the share of home financed with 
debt that may result if the MID is removed or reduced. If removing the MID results in 
lower interest rates (because buyers and sellers split the incidence) or less debt financing, 
these static estimates will over-estimate the true user cost increase from limiting the MID. 
There is sorne empirical evidence that this may be the case, as Hanson (2012) shows that 
mortgage lenders are able to charge higher interest rates as a result of the MID, and the 
lenders receive between 9% and 17% of the subsidy. 
Simulation Results 
Background, Data, and Model Parameters 
1 simulate the effect of both the flat national cap, as well as the clawback proposal with 
the user cost model adjusted for the square footage cap. To simulate the effect of the 
different limits on the user cost of housing, 1 use data from the American Housing Survey 
(AHS) on the square footage of homes both nationally and across metropolitan areas. 7 
Simulations are based on parameter values (interest rate, tax rate, share of debt financing) 
that vary across metropolitan areas. 
The AHS conducts housing stock surveys every other year nationally, as well as for select 
metropolitan areas on a rotating basis.8 The metropolitan-level surveys do not include all 
major cities. To estimate user cost changes in cities not covered by the metropolitan-level 
survey, 1 sample major omissions from the national-level survey.9 For all of the results that 
follow, 1 use the most recent AHS survey data available for a given metropolitan area. The 
year and sample size are detailed in Appendix Exhibit lA. The AHS samples include both 
single-family and multi-family units, as well as both rental and owner-occupied units. 
Although renters are not able to claim the MID, it is still appropriate to use these units 
to examine the effect on user cost as owners of rental property can claim a deduction 
for mortgage expenses, and they may be the most sensitive to changing size of dwelling 
if they are able to divide larger units. 
The sample size of the AHS Metropolitan Survey varies between 2,100 and 5,100 homes 
in each metro area. Data on the square footage of each unit comes from the occupant; 
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Exhibit 1. Average User Cost per Square Foot of Housing Under 
Clawback and Flat Cap Proposal (percentage of user cost 
below cap) 
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interviewers check the accuracy using exterior measurements with permission. 10 Each 
home in the sample represents a number of other homes in the area through a weighting 
process. To estimate the total number of homes in the metro area as well as the number 
above the square footage caps, 1 use the weights provided with each observation. The 
results in Exhibits 2-4 reflect the standard weighting in the AHS survey. 
The sample size in the AHS for sorne of the square footage categories in the clawback 
proposal is quite limited, and in sorne cities, there are no observations in certain 
categories. For instance, in the San }ose sample, there are no homes over 3,600 square 
feet and in the Norfolk Virginia sample there are no homes over 4,000 square feet . 
Fortunately, most metro areas have at least sorne homes in the sample in each category 
outlined in the proposal; however, for those that do not, estimates for the number of 
homes over the cap and the user cost parameters will be underestimates if there are 
actually homes of this size in the area. 
1 create estimates of the Sq parameter for the flat 3,000 square foot cap for each metro 
area. 1 estimate the average Sq parameter for each metro area in two ways: first a true 
metro average that includes those homes that have Sq equal to zero, and then the average 
Sq for only homes that are above the cap. 1 estimate the average (1 - s) parameter from 
the clawback proposal each of the ways 1 estimate Sq. Recall that the (1 - s) parameter 
depends on which category the home falls into and reduces the deduction accordingly, 
the Sq parameter depends on how far over the cap the home is. Exhibit 2 shows the 
estimates of these parameters nationally and across all metropolitan areas in the sample. 
The change in user cost from the policy will depend on the interaction between the 
home size distribution, income tax rates as they apply to the deduction (state income tax 
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Exhibit 2. Effect of Square Footage Cap on MIO Across Metro Areas 
Sq Cost Change (1 - s) Cost Change 
Para meter Para meter 
Average Average, Average Average 
% of Homes lncluding Abo ve lncluding Abo ve 
Number of over 3,000 Zero Cap Zero Cap 
Metro Area Homes Sq. Ft. Changes Only Changes Only 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NATIONAL 128,203,134 9.46% 0.027 0.284 0.056 0.596 
Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA 995,557 5.98% 0.014 0.245 0.034 0.571 
Atlanta, GA 1,842,131 15.58% 0.045 0.288 0.098 0.631 
Baltimore, MD 1,028,133 15.53% 0.044 0.288 0.097 0.626 
Birmingham, AL 394,033 10.43% 0.020 0.191 0.064 0.616 
Boston, MA 1,150,506 10.92% 0.029 0.269 0.068 0.621 
Buffalo, NY 515,489 7.89% 0.018 0.232 0.044 0.562 
Charlotte, NC 667,824 9.50% 0.026 0.278 0.055 0.583 
Chicago, IL 2,256,039 8.33% 0.014 0.332 0.050 0.602 
Cincinnati, OH 647,516 8.49% 0.016 0.186 0.050 0.587 
Cleveland, OH 870,831 9.45% 0.023 0.245 0.053 0.556 
Columbus, OH 682,550 7.50% 0.018 0.246 0.041 0.545 
Dalias, TX 1,365,398 9.68% 0.023 0.236 0.052 0.535 
Denver, CO 956,551 14.51% 0.033 0.232 0.087 0.600 
Detroit, MI 1,877,140 10.17% 0.028 0.299 0.060 0.587 
Ft. Worth-Arlington, TX 639,381 7.82% 0.020 0.268 0.043 0.553 
Hartford, CT 502,397 9.92% 0.027 0.275 0.055 0.558 
Houston, TX 2,159,482 9.95% 0.025 0.256 0.053 0.533 
lndianapolis, IN 755,605 10.65% 0.029 0.275 0.064 0.598 
Kansas City, MO 896,882 10.27% 0.027 0.269 0.062 0.606 
Los Angeles, CA 3,297,536 5.32% 0.016 0.310 0.031 0.581 
Memphis, TN 501,041 9.28% 0.023 0.251 0.053 0.573 
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, FL 1 ,329,121 13.88% 0.043 0.318 0.088 0.633 
Milwaukee, Wl 626,507 15.16% 0.031 0.208 0.082 0.544 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 1,329,150 13.55% 0.032 0.244 0.076 0.560 
New Orleans, LA 587,080 7.50% 0.023 0.315 0.045 0.602 
New York, NY 3,574,469 4.25% 0.014 0.373 0.026 0.613 
Norfolk, VA 632,124 5.19% 0.007 0.134 0.026 0.499 
Oakland, CA 895,037 5.37% 0.007 0.132 0.027 0.501 
Oklahoma City, OK 503,036 5.13% 0.014 0.273 0.032 0.619 
Philadelphia, PA 1,943,954 13.56% 0.049 0.356 0.087 0.640 
Phoenix, AZ 1,340,345 6.69% 0.021 0.313 0.039 0.590 
Pittsburgh, PA 1,085,345 8.84% 0.024 0.267 0.053 0.604 
Portland, OR 811,747 7.37% 0.018 0.243 0.040 0.547 
Providence, Rl 415,381 4.82% 0.009 0.185 0.029 0.604 
Riverside, CA 1,229,407 5.00% 0.015 0.290 0.033 0.659 
Rochester, NY 448,531 6.61% 0.008 0.124 0.029 0.444 
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Exhibit 2. Effect of Square Footage Cap on MIO Across Metro Areas 
(continued) 
Sq Cost Change (1 - s) Cost Change 
Para meter Para meter 
Average Average, Average Average 
% of Homes lncluding Above lncluding Abo ve 
Number of over 3,000 Zero Cap Zero Cap 
Metro Area Homes Sq. Ft. Changes Only Changes Only 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sacramento, CA 744,470 6.55% 0.019 0.301 0.038 0.583 
Salt Lake City, UT 443,995 16.38% 0.029 0.181 0.097 0.591 
San Antonio, TX 659,374 5.72% 0.018 0.315 0.032 0.561 
San Diego, CA 1,071,968 4.94% 0.013 0.273 0.032 0.643 
San Francisco, CA 700,195 5.18% 0.006 0.111 0.021 0.396 
San Jase, CA 591,432 4.29% 0.003 0.082 0.015 0.341 
Seattle, WA 1,091,962 9.02% 0.022 0.247 0.049 0.544 
St. Louis, MO 1,167,471 12.90% 0.031 0.241 0.078 0.604 
Tampa-St. Petersburg, FL 1,322,437 5.54% 0.022 0.402 0.035 0.627 
Washington, OC 2,133,221 17.64% 0.047 0.268 0.113 0.640 
Notes: The source is authors' calculations using American Housing Survey Metro and National Data Files 
for 1998-2007. See the Appendix for metro area definitions. The number of homes and percentage of 
homes over 3,000 sq. ft . are based on weighted samples. See the Appendix for sample sizes. 
rates and availability of the mortgage interest deduction), differences in mortgage interest 
rates, and the share of debt financing as shown in equations (5) and (8). The AHS contains 
data on the size of original mortgage, mortgage interest rate, and house price that allows 
calculation of the e and i 2 parameters. 11 1 add data from state tax forms on availability of 
the MID and state marginal tax rates to create a more accurate estima te of the t parameter 
across areas. To add detall on initial user cost, 1 also construct a measure of m and TP 
with the AHS data. 12 
According to the AHS data, 9.46% of homes nation-wide are larger than 3,000 square feet 
and would lose sorne tax-preferred status under both the flat national cap and clawback 
proposal. As shown in Exhibit 2, there is substantial difference in the user cost change 
parameter, Sq, when calculating it using an average of all homes versus calculating it 
using only the homes over the proposed limit. The difference for the user cost change 
parameter (1 - s) under the clawback proposal is even more pronounced. 
User Cost Changes 
The national user cost change shows how the annual cost of owning a home would 
increase substantially under either type of MID limit. Exhibit 3 shows how each proposal 
changes the user cost of housing using nationally, and across metropolitan areas. The 
NATIONAL row shows that the severity ofthe average national user cost increase depends 
on whether 1 use all homes or only those over the proposed cap. The cost change 
measured for only those over the cap is 17.3% annually under the clawback proposal. 
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Metro Area 
NATIONAL 
Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA 
Atlanta, GA 
Baltimore, MD 
Birmingham, AL 
Boston, MA 
Buffalo, NY 
Charlotte, NC 
Chicago, IL 
Cincinnati, OH 
Cleveland, OH 
Columbus, OH 
Dalias, TX 
Denver, CO 
Detroit, MI 
Ft. Worth-Arlington, TX 
Hartford, CT 
Houston, TX 
lndianapolis, IN 
Kansas City, MO 
Los Angeles, CA 
Memphis, TN 
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, FL 
Milwaukee, Wl 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 
New Orleans, LA 
New York, NY 
Norfolk, VA 
Oakland, CA 
Oklahoma City, OK 
Philadelphia, PA 
Phoenix, AZ 
Pittsburgh, PA 
Portland, OR 
Providence, Rl 
Riverside, CA 
Rochester, NY 
Sacramento, CA 
User Cost With Clawback Proposal 
Metro Average 
Per $1 
0.054 
0.040 
0.045 
0.049 
0.044 
0.054 
0.071 
0.046 
0.060 
0.058 
0.063 
0.056 
0.061 
0.043 
0.061 
0.069 
0.066 
0.067 
0.053 
0.053 
0.043 
0.055 
0.061 
0.065 
0.049 
0.051 
0.053 
0.048 
0.041 
0.047 
0.064 
0.041 
0.075 
0.047 
0.064 
0.041 
0.072 
0.041 
% 
In crease 
1.57% 
1.89% 
3.61% 
3.18% 
0.50% 
1.50% 
1.25% 
2.52% 
1.24% 
0.49% 
0.98% 
1.13% 
1.53% 
3.14% 
1.56% 
1.14% 
1.01% 
1.23% 
1.61% 
2.42% 
1.50% 
1.34% 
2.05% 
2.46% 
2.66% 
1.27% 
0.90% 
0.52% 
0.67% 
1.30% 
2.17% 
2.01% 
0.86% 
1.85% 
0.28% 
1.94% 
0.32% 
1.63% 
Only Homes 
Over Cap 
Per $1 
0.062 
0.052 
0.054 
0.058 
0.046 
0.061 
0.081 
0.057 
0.069 
0.061 
0.069 
0.064 
0.070 
0.050 
0.069 
0.078 
0.072 
0.075 
0.060 
0.064 
0.054 
0.062 
0.069 
0.073 
0.057 
0.059 
0.064 
0.053 
0.046 
0.058 
0.073 
0.053 
0.082 
0.058 
0.068 
0.056 
0.076 
0.051 
% 
lncrease 
17.30% 
31 .58% 
23.16% 
20.45% 
4.83% 
13.77% 
15.79% 
26.49% 
14.93% 
5.74% 
10.34% 
15.07% 
15.80% 
21.64% 
15.37% 
14.63% 
10.17% 
12.35% 
15.11% 
23.59% 
28.27% 
14.43% 
14.80% 
16.21% 
19.60% 
16.98% 
21.26% 
9.94% 
12.43% 
25.28% 
16.00% 
30.08% 
9.76% 
25.03% 
5.86% 
38.83% 
4.78% 
24.83% 
----- --- --------- --- ---
User Cost With Flat 3,000 Sq. Ft. 
Cap 
Metro Average 
Per $1 
0.053 
0.040 
0.044 
0.048 
0.044 
0.054 
0.070 
0.046 
0.060 
0.058 
0.063 
0.056 
0.061 
0.042 
0.060 
0.068 
0.065 
0.067 
0.052 
0.053 
0.042 
0.055 
0.061 
0.064 
0.048 
0.051 
0.053 
0.048 
0.041 
0.046 
0.064 
0.041 
0.075 
0.046 
0.064 
0.041 
0.072 
0.041 
% 
lncrease 
0.68% 
0.78% 
1.64% 
1.44% 
0.16% 
0.64% 
0.50% 
1.16% 
0.34% 
0.15% 
0.42% 
0.51 % 
0.67% 
1.20% 
0.74% 
0.54% 
0.49% 
0.57% 
0.73% 
1.06% 
0.79% 
0.57% 
1.00% 
0.92% 
1.11% 
0.65% 
0.50% 
0.14% 
0.1 7% 
0.56% 
1.21% 
1.09% 
0.38% 
0.80% 
0.08% 
0.86% 
0.09% 
0.82% 
Only Homes 
Over Cap 
Per $1 
0.057 
0.045 
0.048 
0.052 
0.045 
0.057 
0.075 
0.051 
0.065 
0.059 
0.065 
0.059 
0.065 
0.045 
0.065 
0.073 
0.068 
0.071 
0.055 
0.057 
0.048 
0.058 
0.064 
0.067 
0.052 
0.055 
0.060 
0.049 
0.042 
0.051 
0.069 
0.047 
0.078 
0.051 
0.065 
0.047 
0.073 
0.046 
% 
lncrease 
7.83% 
13.57% 
10.56% 
9.40% 
1.50% 
5.96% 
6.52% 
12.60% 
8.22% 
1.82% 
4.55% 
6.79% 
6.98% 
8.37% 
7.82% 
7.10% 
5.01% 
5.92% 
6.95% 
10.46% 
15.10% 
6.31% 
7.44% 
6.20% 
8.52% 
8.88% 
12.95% 
2.66% 
3.27% 
11.13% 
8.90% 
15.99% 
4.32% 
11.09% 
1.79% 
17.12% 
1.34% 
12.80% 
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Exhibit 3. User Cost Changes Across Metro Areas (continued) 
User Cost With Flat 3,000 Sq. Ft. 
User Cost With Clawback Proposal Cap 
Only Homes Only Homes 
Metro Average Over Cap Metro Average Over Cap 
% % % % 
Metro Area Per $1 lncrease Per $1 lncrease Per $1 lncrease Per $1 lncrease 
Salt Lake City, UT 0.046 1.87% 0.050 11.44% 0.046 0.56% 0.047 3.51% 
San Antonio, TX 0.072 0.70% 0.080 12.26% 0.072 0.38% 0.076 6.88% 
San Diego, CA 0.040 1.76% 0.053 35.57% 0.040 0.72% 0.045 15.09% 
San Francisco, CA 0.041 0.46% 0.045 8.87% 0.041 0.12% 0.042 2.48% 
San Jase, CA 0.040 0.37% 0.043 8.69% 0.040 0.09% 0.041 2.10% 
Seattle-Everett, WA 0.052 1.11% 0.058 12.31% 0.052 0.50% 0.055 5.60% 
St. Louis, MO 0.050 2.55% 0.059 19.77% 0.050 1.01 % 0.053 7.90% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg, FL 0.061 0.76% 0.069 13.71% 0.061 0.48% 0.066 8.79% 
Washington, DC 0.043 4.93% 0.053 27.95% 0.042 2.06% 0.046 11 .70% 
Notes: The source is authors' calculations using a marginal tax rate of 25% plus the top state income tax 
rates for states that allow the M ID, average metropolitan area mortgage interest rate, maintenance costs, 
property tax rate, and share debt financed. House price inflation of 3.8% opportunity cost of equity of 6% 
is given in all areas. (1 - s) and Sq parameters from Exhibit 2. See the Appendix for metro area definitions. 
User cost represents the average annual cost of awning a home per dallar of home purchased; for the 
3,000 sq. ft. cap, this relies on the assumption that the marginal cost of square footage is constant. 
When including those that have no change in tax preference, the simulated user cost 
increase is a modest 1.17% annually. 
The clawback proposal would have a substantial effect on the annual cost of home 
ownership for homes over 3,000 square feet; however, most of this increase would be 
due to the feature of the proposal that removes the deduction on the entire home rather 
than the marginal square footage only. To get an idea of how much of the cost change 
would be due to clawback and how much would be due to the 3,000 square foot limit 
on the MID, 1 compare the user cost changes to the flat 3,000 square foot cap, shown in 
the last four columns of E:xhibit 3. Nationally, the flat cap would increase the annual cost 
of home ownership for homes over the cap by 7 .8%, less than half of the increase under 
the clawback proposal. The user cost increase is substantially lower when 1 calculate the 
average cost change using all homes, showing an average annual cost increase of less 
than 1%. 
Limiting the MID affects metropolitan areas quite differently, both in terms of the 
percentage of homes that lose sorne tax preferred status and the annual cost of 
homeownership. Column (2) in E:xhibit 2 shows the percentage of homes that would 
lose tax preferred status with a 3,000 square foot cap on the MID in each of the 46 
metropolitan areas in the AHS; E:xhibit 5 displays this information in a map . The 
percentage of homes over 3,000 square feet ranges from a low of 4.25% in New York, 
New York to a high of 17.6% in Washington, D.C. The median city, Cincinnati, Ohio has 
about 8.5% of homes over 3,000 square feet that would lose sorne tax-preferred status. 
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Exhibit 4. Home Price Declines Across Metro Areas 
Clawback Proposal Flat 3,000 Sq. Ft. Cap 
Only Homes Only Homes 
Metro Average Over Cap Metro Average Over Cap 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
NATIONAL - $3,566 -$67,834 -$1,564 - $33,507 
Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA - $6,752 -$174,920 -$2,830 - $87,080 
Atlanta, GA - $8,767 - $94,653 - $4,062 -$48,089 
Baltimore, MD - $8,102 - $89,366 - $3,726 - $45,241 
Birmingham, AL - $1,036 - $19,041 - $323 - $6,098 
Boston, MA - $3,740 - $61 ,132 - $1,611 - $28.403 
Buffalo, NY -$1,397 -$30,950 - $559 - $13,899 
Charlotte, NC - $5,193 - $88,591 - $2,432 - $47,348 
Chicago, IL - $2,226 - $47,074 - $612 - $27,532 
Cincinnati, OH - $692 - $15,481 -$219 - $5,104 
Cleveland, OH - $1,294 -$25,071 - $564 - $11,650 
Columbus, OH - $1,836 - $43,037 -$833 - $20,906 
Dalias, TX - $2,525 -$45,740 - $1,108 - $21,879 
Denver, CO -$7,723 - $90,233 - $2,995 -$39,173 
Detroit, MI - $2,411 - $41,752 - $1,156 -$22,734 
Ft. Worth-Arlington, TX - $1,686 -$38,063 - $798 - $19,772 
Hartford, CT - $1,692 - $31,272 - $823 -$16,181 
Houston, TX - $1,855 - $33,573 - $863 - $17,074 
lndianapolis, IN - $2,747 -$45,524 -$1,260 - $22,537 
Kansas City, MO - $4,170 - $67,275 - $1,849 - $33,363 
Los Angeles, CA - $5,081 - $151,159 - $2,672 - $89,985 
Memphis, TN - $2,222 - $42,387 - $961 - $19,962 
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, FL - $4,340 - $55,580 - $2,131 - $29,850 
Milwaukee, Wl - $3.490 - $40,597 - $1,319 - $16,997 
Minneapolis-St. Paul , MN - $5,464 - $69,212 - $2,324 - $33,156 
New Orleans, LA - $2,648 - $61,145 - $1,352 - $34,335 
New York, NY - $2,289 -$89,586 - $1,274 -$58,572 
Norfolk, VA - $1 ,262 - $44,433 - $343 - $12,741 
Oakland, CA - $2,521 - $84,155 - $663 -$24,070 
Oklahoma City, OK - $2,305 - $72,628 - $1,006 -$36,049 
Philadelphia, PA - $3,681 - $47,830 - $2,078 - $28,329 
Phoenix, AZ - $5,319 - $124,704 - $2,910 - $74,340 
Pittsburgh, PA - $885 - $18,394 - $394 - $8,571 
Portland, OR - $4,140 - $91.488 - $1,818 - $45,631 
Providence, Rl - $446 - $17,532 - $132 - $5,581 
Riverside, CA - $6,167 - $181,037 - $2,748 - $94,604 
Rochester, NY - $348 - $10,071 - $95 - $2,918 
Sacramento, CA - $4,713 - $117,251 - $2.411 - $66,881 
Salt Lake City, UT - $4,067 - $45.404 - $1,242 - $15,002 
San Antonio, TX - $894 - $28,047 - $491 - $16,524 
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Exhibit 4. Home Price Declines Across Metro Areas (continued) 
Clawback Proposal Flat 3,000 Sq. Ft. Cap 
Only Homes Only Homes 
Metro Average Over Cap Metro Average Over Cap 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
San Diego, CA - $6.452 - $196,171 - $2,683 - $98,039 
San Francisco, CA - $1,733 - $61,694 - $471 - $18,318 
San Jose, CA - $1,584 - $68,218 - $374 - $17,538 
Seattle-Everett, WA - $2,578 - $51.452 - $1,159 - $24,886 
St. Louis, MO - $4,458 - $59,168 - $1,792 - $26,254 
Tampa-St. Petersburg, FL - $1,347 - $43,066 - $849 - $28,870 
Washington, DC - $17,762 - $165,198 - $7,621 - $79,246 
Notes: The source is authors' calculations using a marginal tax rate of 25% plus the top state income tax 
rates for states that allow the MID, average metropolitan area mortgage interest rate, maintenance costs, 
property tax rate, and share debt financed. House price inflation of 3.8% opportunity cost of equity of 6% 
is given in all areas. (1 - s) and Sq parameters are from Exhibit 2. Metro area rents are median rents from 
the 2009 American Community Survey; rents for homes over the cap are taken as double the metro area 
median . See the Appendix for metro area definitions. 
- - Exhibit 5. Percentage of Homes over 3,000 Square Feet 
e 15-18% 
e 12-15% • 5-7% 
• 9-12% ... 4-5% Source: Data from American Housing Survey, Map generated using ArcGIS software. 
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In addition to the percentage of homes subject to the cap, user cost would also change 
because of the intensity of exposure to the cap. The Sq and (1 - s) parameters reflect 
the intensity of exposure to the cap. Exhibit 2 shows the substantial variation in the Sq 
and (1 - s) parameters across metropolitan areas. The size of the Sq and (1 - s) 
parameters also varies depending on if I leave in the homes below the cap or calculate 
them based only on the homes over 3,000 square feet. The difference in the size of the 
parameters reflects how much of the housing stock would be exposed to each policy 
across cities. 
The average change in user cost for homes exposed to the cap under the clawback 
proposal varies substantially across metropolitan areas. The simulations show the smallest 
user cost change in Rochester, New York at 4 .78% increase in the average annual cost 
of homeownership. According to the simulations, the largest user cost change under the 
clawback proposal would occur in Riverside, California. The user cost increase in 
Riverside would be a whopping 38.8%. The median increase in the user cost of housing 
under the clawback proposal would be in the Detroit, Michigan metropolitan area, with 
an expected increase of about 15.37% in the annual cost of owning a home. 
The user cost increases under the clawback proposal are highest in southern California 
and the Washington, D.C. area. Cities in California have sorne of the highest expected 
cost increases, with Anaheim, Los Angeles, Riverside, and San Diego all experiencing 
greater than a 28% rise in user cost. Midwestern cities tend to be closer to the median, 
with St. Louis, Missouri, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Columbus, Ohio, Indianapolis, Indiana, 
and Minneapolis, Minnesota all between a 15% and 20% increase in user cost. In addition, 
residents over the cap in most cities would experience at least a 10% increase in the 
annual cost of homeownership with the exceptions being Birmingham, Alabama, 
Cincinnati, Ohio, Norfolk, Virginia, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Providence, Rhode Island, 
Rochester, New York, San Francisco, California, and San }ose, California. 
To separate the effects of the clawback and a 3,000 square foot cap, I simulate the user 
cost change for a cap that removes the deduction on only the marginal square footage 
over 3,000. The last four columns of Exhibit 3 present the simulation results for the flat 
3,000 square foot cap using only variation from the home size differences across cities. 
As with the clawback proposal, the user cost changes would vary substantially across 
metropolitan areas. The smallest user cost changes under the flat cap proposal are in 
many of the same areas as the clawback proposal: Rochester, New York, Birmingham, 
Alabama, Providence, Rhode Island, and Cincinnati, Ohio all have an average annual cost 
increase of less than 2%. This overlap suggests that the more compact home-size 
distribution would drive user cost changes in these cities. 
The largest user cost changes under the flat cap proposal would occur in cities that are 
quite similar to those that would experience the largest increase under the clawback 
proposal. Under the flat cap proposal, Riverside, California would experience the largest 
user cost increase, 17.2% annually. Homes over the cap in Phoenix, Atizona and San 
Diego, Anaheim, and Los Angeles, California would all experience a user cost increase 
over 30%. These cities are also in the upper part of the user cost increase distribution 
for the clawback proposal, suggesting that the combined effects of home size and 
clawback are important. 
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Using an empirical estimate of the elasticity of home size with respect to tax-induced 
user cost changes of - 1.4 produced by Hanson (2010), the user cost changes would 
induce changes in home size as large as 50% for homes above the cap in sorne markets. 
1 expect that most changes in home size would occur over the long run as new 
construction becomes smaller and larger homes are subdivided into townhomes or 
condominiums. Taking the elasticity estimate in Hanson (2010), the user cost estimates 
presented here, suggest that the clawback proposal would eventually reduce the average 
size of homes nationally by about 2.2% or 54 square feet, and the flat cap would reduce 
the size of homes by about 1%, or 25 square feet. The driver behind the size declines 
will be a reduction in the size of homes over the cap, where the size declines would be 
substantial. 
Home Price Changes 
To calculate price changes from the proposed MID limits, 1 use equations (6) and (9) , 
which follow directly from the user cost model. Combining the user cost changes with 
data on rents allows me to estimate how the proposed policies might affect home prices. 
1 use median rent data from the 2009 American Community Survey to estimate the price 
effect for the metropolitan area average, and then double the median rent as an 
approximation for price effects on homes over the 3,000 square foot limit. All other 
parameters are the same as those used to calculate user cost changes. 1 expect that if 
either proposal were to become law, price declines would domínate any behavioral 
effects on home size purchase in the short nm. Over a longer time period, with building 
smaller new homes or existing homes being subdivided, size declines would take hold. 
The national average price reduction from the clawback style cap would be $3,566, with 
substantial variation across metropolitan areas , as shown in E:xhibit 4. By far the largest 
price reduction at the metropolitan area level would be in Washington, D.C. at $17,762 
due to the larger size of homes, higher renta! rates, and high marginal tax rate. At the 
other end of the spectrum, Rochester, New York would have less than a $350 decline 
for metro area average prices, and Cincinnati, Ohio, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Providence, 
Rhode lsland, and San Antonio, Texas would have less than a $1 ,000 decline on average. 
For homes over the proposed clawback cap, the expected price declines would be 
sizable, as shown in column (2) of E:xhibit 4. Recall that the clawback proposal would 
penalize the entire home if it is larger than the limit, not merely penalizing size on the 
margin. The national average price decline for homes over the cap for the clawback 
proposal would be $67,834, and again metropolitan areas would have substantial 
differences. The upper end of the price decline distribution would include severa! 
metropolitan areas with expected declines of more than $150,000 (Anaheim, Los Angeles, 
Riverside, San Diego, and Washington D.C.). Even the smallest predicted price declines 
are more than $10,000, with most declines in the $40,000 to $60,000 range. 
The flat cap proposal would induce more modest price declines, due to only penalizing 
the marginal size over the 3,000 square foot limit. Nationally, this proposal would cause 
a $1,564 decline in median home prices, again with varying degrees of severity across 
metropolitan areas. The primary feature of this proposal is the price decline depends on 
how much larger than the cap homes are, so the distribution of declines would be 
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somewhat different than the clawback distribution. Washington, D.C. again would show 
the largest decline at $7,621 , followed by Atlanta at $4,062. Several metropolitan areas 
would have less than a $1 ,000 price decline, with the smallest declines in many of the 
same areas that are least effected by the clawback proposal. 
For homes over the proposed tlat cap, expected price declines are roughly half the size 
as the clawback cap, which indicates that penalizing the entire home rather than marginal 
square footage would drive about half of the price declines under the clawback proposal. 
Nationally, homes over the flat cap would experience a $33,507 decline in price, with 
declines ranging from $98,039 in San Diego, California to $2 ,918 in Rochester, NewYork. 
Policy Considerations 
Limiting the MID based on the square footage of a home would represent a major change 
in federal tax policy toward housing. There are important aspects of this policy to 
consider besides how it changes the annual cost of horneownership and home prices. 
Sorne considerations relate to the user cost, such as how the policy would affect home 
sizes, while others are practica! in nature, such as how the lnternal Revenue Service 
would implement such a policy. 
The direct effect of the user cost increase is a reduction in square footage consumed over 
the limit. The size of the response depends on whether home purchasers finance marginal 
square footage with debt or equity, as the MID limit would only affect the price of debt 
financed housing. Sorne homes may be able to adjust more easily than others to the user 
cost increase, most notably new construction where the size is not yet determined. For 
existing homes, it is possible that large units could convert to condominiums or 
townhornes, but sorne homes may not be able to adjust size in a cost-effective way. 
The policy change will reduce horne values on existing homes that cannot adjust square 
footage. Solving the user cost equation for P H instead of R shows the magnitude of the 
reduction in value. To lessen the burden on existing owners of large homes, policyrnakers 
rnay want to consider phasing in such a policy or implementing a larger cap for existing 
homes than new construction. 13 The user cost model predicts an abrupt and severe 
change in P H; however, the changing debt-to-equity ratio, which declines as a home 
owner pays off the mortgage, suggests the change may not be as severe as the simple 
model indicates. 
One practica! concem is the choice of a home's components that are considered as part 
of the square footage calculation. Policymakers would have to decide if basement and 
garage areas, partial outdoor areas such as three-season rooms, and attic space are 
included in the square footage calculation. All of these choices would add complexity to 
the income tax code. If sorne of these were not included in the square footage, 
substitution between them and other areas would occur, resulting in inefficiency. One 
such trade-off, for example, could be substitution from additional closet space to more 
attic space if attic space were not included in the square footage calculation. Homeowners 
may also substitute along quality dimensions, choosing more elaborate home fixtures or 
furnishings instead of additional square footage. 
Finally, limiting the MID based on the square footage of a home requires the IRS to 
somehow monitor compliance. First, the IRS needs to determine how to allocate square 
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footage across debt and equity financed housing. The second problem is how the IRS 
obtains information on the square footage of a home. Self-reported square footage is likely 
to be unreliable, so the agency may have to consider relying on third-party reporting, 
possibly from county property tax assessors or builders. These problems could impose 
non-trivial administrative costs that cut into any revenues gained from limiting the MID 
and would add additional complexity to the tax code. 
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In this paper, 1 extend the standard user cost of housing model to include a cap on 
mortgage interest deductibility based on home size. 1 use the extended model to simulate 
the user cost effects of two different MID limits: a clawback proposal and a flat cap 
proposal. The simulations show how each policy affects the average user cost of housing 
across a range of metropolitan areas. Under the flat cap, the user cost increase across 
metropolitan areas would range from a low of a 1.34% in Rochester, New York toa high 
of 17.12% in Riverside, California. Under the clawback proposal, the user cost change 
across metropolitan areas would range from a low of 4.78% in Rochester, New York to 
a high of 38.83% in Riverside, California. These user cost changes translate into expected 
price declines on homes exposed to the clawback cap ranging from $196,171 in San 
Diego, California toa decline of $10,071 in Rochester, New York. Expected price declines 
under the flat cap would be about half the magnitude as declines under the clawback 
proposal. 
1 provide a model and simulation results that are useful when considering the impact of 
proposals that would limit the MID by the size of home purchased. There is substantial 
difference between a policy that removes the marginal deduction and a policy that 
removes the deduction on the entire home (clawback). 1 show that both the number 
homes affected by the policy, and the intensity those homes are exposed to the cap affect 
housing affordability. The simulations presented here suggest that limiting the MID by 
the size of home induces a substantial increase in the user cost of housing, as well as 
declines in home prices, and that these changes are distributed unevenly across 
metropolitan areas. 
Exhibit 1A. AHS Survey Geography, Timing, and Sample Size 
Areas lncluded in Survey Vear Surveyed Sample Size 
Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA Anaheim city, Santa Ana city, Garden Grave 2002 4,911 
city 
Atlanta, GA Atlanta city, DeKalb County, Cobb County 2004 5,132 
Baltimore, MD Baltimore city, Baltimore County, Anne 2007 2,733 
Arundel County 
Birmingham, AL Jefferson County, Shelby County 1998 5,066 
Boston, MA Boston city, Cambridge city, Lynn city 2007 2,771 
Buffalo, NY Erie County, Niagara Falls City 2002 4,555 
LIMITING THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BY SIZE OF HOME 17 
• ea.I§n·l 
- -
Exhibit 1A. AHS Survey Geography, Timing, and Sample Size 
(continued) 
Areas lncluded in Survey Year Surveyed Sample Size 
Charlotte, NC Mecklenburg County, NC, Gaston County, NC, 2002 5,119 
York County, SC 
Chicago, IL" Cook County, DuPage County 2003 2,863 
Cincinnati , OH Hamilton County, OH Kenton County 1998 5,041 
Cleveland, OH Cuyahoga County, Lake County 2004 4,722 
Columbus, OH Franklin County, Licking County 2002 4,936 
Dalias, TX Dalias County, Collin County 2002 5,743 
Denver, CO Denver city, Jefferson County, Arapahoe 2004 4,834 
County 
Detroit, MI" Wayne County, Oakland County 2003 2,186 
Ft. Worth-Arlington, TX Tarrant County 2002 5,052 
Hartford, CT Hartford city, New Britain city, Bristol city 2004 4,728 
Houston, TX Harris County, Fort Bend County 2007 2,861 
lndianapolis, IN lndianapolis city, Hamilton County, Johnson 2004 4,814 
County 
Kansas City, MO-KS Kansas City city, MO, Kansas City city, KS 2002 4,830 
Jackson County, MO 
Los Angeles, CA" Los Angeles County 2003 3,717 
Memphis, TN Memphis city, Shelby County, TN DeSoto 2004 4,644 
County, MS 
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, FL Dade County, Ft. Lauderdale city 2007 2,647 
Milwaukee, Wl Milwaukee County, Waukesha County 2002 4,823 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN St. Paul city, Hennipin County 2007 2,847 
New Orleans, LA New Orleans city, Jefferson Parish , St. 2004 4,516 
Tammany Parish 
New York, NY• New York city, Nassau County, Suffolk 2003 2,103 
County 
Norfolk, VA Norfolk city, Virginia Beach city, Newport 1998 4,861 
News city 
Oakland, CA Alameda County, Contra Costa County 1998 4.753 
Oklahoma City, OK Oklahoma City city, Oklahoma County, 2004 4,829 
Cleveland County 
Philadelphia, PA" Philadelphia city Montgomery County, 2003 2,353 
Delaware County, 
Phoenix, AZ Maricopa County 2002 5,056 
Pittsburgh, PA Pittsburgh city, Allegheny County, 2004 4,723 
Westmoreland County 
Portland, OR Portland city, Multnomah County, OR 2002 4,917 
Washington County, OR 
Providence, Rl Providence city, Rl, Warwick city, Rl, Cranston 1998 4,724 
city, Rl 
Riverside, CA Riverside County, Riverside City, San 2002 4,932 
Bernardino city 
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Exhibit 1A. AHS Survey Geography, Timing, and Sample Size 
(continued) 
Areas lncluded in Survey Vear Surveyed Sample Size 
Rochester, NV Monroe County, Ontario County 1998 4,763 
Sacramento, CA Sacramento County, Placer County 2004 4,728 
Salt Lake City, UT Davis County, Salt Lake County 1998 4,878 
San Antonio, TX Bexar County, Guadalupe County 2004 4,863 
San Diego, CA San Diego County, San Diego City 2002 4,872 
San Francisco, CA Marin County, San Francisco city, San Mateo 1998 4,813 
County 
San Jase, CA Santa Clara County 1998 4,804 
Seattle, WA King County, Snohomish County 2004 4,731 
St. Louis, MO St. Louis city, St. Louis County, St. Clair 2004 4,741 
County 
Tampa-St. Petersburg, FL Tampa City, Pinellas County 2007 3,053 
Washington, DC District of Columbia, Prince George's County, 2007 2,781 
MD, Fairfax County, VA 
• lndicates Data from National AHS survey. 
-
Endnotes 
1 Under current law, the MID is limited to interest paid on a mortgage of $1,000,000. 
2 For details of Dingell's proposal not discussed here, see: http: 1 /www.house.gov 1 dingell/ 
carbonTaxSummary.shtml. 
3 The average square footage for new single-family homes peaked in 2007 at 2,521. 
4 For a recent review of the literature on tax policy and housing, see Hendershott and White 
(2000) and Anderson, Clemens, and Hanson (2007). Also see Bruce and Holtz-Eakin (1999) 
for a discussion of the economic effects of eliminating housing tax preferences through a 
shift to consumption-based taxation. 
5 For variants of the user cost model, see Rosen (1979a, 1979b, 1985), Poterba (1984, 1992), 
Green and Vandell (1999), Glaeser and Shapiro (2003), Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai 
(2005), and Anderson, Clemens, and Hanson (2007). 
6 If the mortgage interest rate on square footage increases (decreases) as the amount 
borrowed increases, my model will understate (overstate) the user cost increase induced 
by the policy. 
7 The definition of metropolitan area used by the AHS is not consistent with the definition 
used by other agencies; therefore, 1 list the geographic units in each metropolitan area in 
Appendix Table Exhibit lA. 
8 The national survey is conducted in every odd-numbered year, collecting data from a fixed 
sample of about 50,000 homes, and adding newly constructed units. The metropolitan 
survey is conducted in even-numbered years, cycling through a set of 41 metropolitan areas, 
surveying each one about once every six years (ICF, 2006). 
9 For example, there is not a separate recent metropolitan area survey for New York, Los 
Angeles, Detroit, Philadelphia, or Chicago, so 1 draw my sample of these cities from the 
national survey. 
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10 The AHS instructs occupants to include all rooms, hallways, and finished basements and 
attics in this estimate. They also explicitly ask the occupant not to consider unfinished 
attics, carports, attached garages, and porches that are not protected from the elements 
and heated. 
11 The AHS asks owners the original amount of their mortgage and the interest rate on their 
mortgage. 1 use the reported value of the house to create a measure of the share that is 
debt financed and use the reported mortgage interest rate directly. Values are created 
individually and averaged for the metropolitan area to create the parameters. Values for 
the share of debt financing greater than one, which occur due to home equity lending, are 
adjusted to equal one. 
12 The AHS asks owners how much per year they pay in property taxes and how much per 
year they spend on maintenance. 1 divide each of these by the reported value of the house 
to get a rate for m and TP . Values are created individually and averaged for the metropolitan 
area to create the parameters. 
13 For example, President Bush's Tax Reform Advisory Panel recommended a four-year phase-
in of MID caps based on area home values for pre-existing mortgages. They suggested that 
the MID mortgage limit be gradually reduced from the present $1 million to $500,000 over 
three years ($900,000 in year one, $700,000 in year two, and $500,000 in year three). 
Then, in the fourth year, the deduction is subject to region-specific limits based on area 
home values. 
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